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Abstract 
We investigate the effectiveness of capital controls in insulating economies from currency crises, 
focusing in particular on both direct and indirect effects of capital controls and how these 
relationships may have changed over time in response to global financial liberalization  and the 
greater mobility of international capital. We predict the likelihood of currency crises using 
standard macroeconomic variables and a probit equation estimation methodology with random 
effects. We employ a comprehensive panel data set comprised of 69 emerging market and 
developing economies over 1975–2004. Both standard and duration-adjusted measures of capital 
control intensity (allowing controls to ―depreciate‖ over time) suggest that capital controls have 
not effectively insulated economies from currency crises at any time during our sample period. 
Maintaining real GDP growth and limiting real overvaluation are critical factors preventing 
currency crises, not capital controls. However, the presence of capital controls greatly increases 
the sensitivity of currency crises to changes in real GDP growth and real exchange rate 
overvaluation, making countries more vulnerable to changes in fundamentals. Our model 
suggests that emerging markets weathered the 2007-08 crisis relatively well because of strong 
output growth and exchange rate flexibility that limited overvaluation of their currencies.  
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1. Introduction 
Many economists and policymakers have focused on large and volatile capital flows as 
an underlying source of instability to the international financial system and a causal factor to 
currency crises. A common view is that liberalization of international capital flows, especially 
when combined with fixed exchange rates, is either an underlying cause or at least a contributing 
factor behind these financial disruptions. A common policy prescription under these 
circumstances is to impose restrictions on capital flows and other international payments with the 
hope of insulating economies from speculative attacks and thereby creating greater currency 
stability. The 2007-08 global financial crisis and its effects in emerging markets has contributed 
even greater urgency to this debate, and the International Monetary Fund  now views more 
favorably than in the past the use of capital controls as a viable policy option to limit excessive 
capital inflows (see Ostry et. al., 2010)
1.   
However, the empirical literature provides mixed results regarding the effectiveness of 
capital controls in insulating nations from currency crises (Eichengreen, 2001). Some studies, 
mainly dealing with individual country experiences, suggest that capital controls are an 
important instrument in insulating countries from excess exchange rate and capital flow 
volatility. Rodrik (2002), for example, argues that capital controls were an effective means of 
stemming the financial crisis in Malaysia in 1998, and was a better alternative to conditions that 
                                                 
1 There are other reasons to impose capital controls in addition to the desire of countries to insulate  
themselves from currency instability. For example, there is a literature focusing on the links between 
capital controls and growth (see the survey and analysis in Edison, et. al., 2004). Some authors argue 
that the impressive economic growth in South Korea in the 1970s-1980s, and China since the mid-
1980s, is linked to a range of industrial policies supported in part by tight control on the magnitude and 
composition of international capital inflows and outflows. However, others argue that it is difficult to 
establish a robust causal relationship between the degree of financial integration and output growth 
performance (Prasad et. al., 2003). The focus on our study—the linkage between capital controls and 
currency crises—is only one consideration among several that should be considered by policy makers 
when making choices concerning capital controls.    
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would have been imposed if the country had adopted an IMF program. Other studies, usually 
based on multi-country panel data sets, suggest that controls are not especially effective in 
protecting countries from exchange rate instability or capital flow contractions (e.g. Glick and 
Hutchison, 2005; Edwards, 2005; Eichengreen et al., 2006; and Glick, Guo 
 and Hutchison, 2006).  
Much of the empirical work investigating the effectiveness of capital controls is based on 
the construction of capital control indices—measuring the intensity and strength of controls—
that rely on legislative and administrative rules (de jure) on the inflow and outflow of financial 
capital and restrictions on international payments. These measures are very useful since they 
allow many countries to be compared over time and powerful panel-data tests to investigate the 
effectiveness of capital controls. However, one drawback of capital control indices based on 
legal and administrative measures is that they do not capture the extent to which they are 
enforced (that in turn depend on the quality of the bureaucracy and political considerations) or 
the extent to which they may be circumvented by market forces.  
Changes in international and domestic financial markets in recent years may have 
changed the effectiveness of capital controls in insulating economies from financial disturbances. 
Firstly, financial and trade integration in the world economy, and the development of global 
financial markets and financial institutions with increasing global reach, has made it easier to 
circumvent capital controls. Hence, we would expect de jure capital controls to lose their 
effectiveness over time in response to an increasingly liberal global financial environment 
irrespective of the period of time that capital controls have been in place in a given country. That 
is, we would expect a given level of de jure capital controls to be less effective in maintaining 
exchange rate and capital flow stability since the latter part of 1990s compared with the 1970s 
and early 1980s. Secondly, domestic economic forces work to erode the effectiveness of capital  
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account restrictions and that they become weaker over time as investors and markets adjust and 
find ways to circumvent them, and that this characteristic may lead to misleading inferences 
from empirical work that does not control for this feature of the institutional arrangements. There 
is a large literature on domestic financial innovation and how this process is partly driven over 
time by the extent of financial market restrictions. The more binding are restrictions, the larger 
are the economic benefits from circumventing the controls. And the longer the controls are in 
place, the more likely that financial innovations have developed in a way that allows agents to 
circumvent them. We postulate that international financial innovation also partly evolves as a 
means to circumvent legal and administrative controls on international capital movements.  
We address the first issue by measuring the effectiveness of capital controls over various 
sample periods, testing to see if their effectiveness has changed over time. We address the 
second issue by constructing a simple ―duration adjusted‖ measure of capital controls (de facto 
capital controls) and using this index to investigate the effectiveness of capital controls in 
insulating countries from exchange rate instability. Our measure is linked to the de jure 
―intensity‖ of capital controls and the length of time that controls have been in place. Other 
things equal, our ―duration-adjusted‖ measure declines with the length of the period that controls 
have been in place. Our premise is that economic forces work to erode the effectiveness of 
capital account restrictions and that they become weaker over time as investors and markets 
adjust and find ways to circumvent them. The ―erosion‖ of capital controls may occur faster 
when the incentive to evade capital controls is large (Gros, 1987). A third issue we address is 
how capital controls may affect the stability of a currency directly and indirectly by influencing 
the sensitivity of currencies to changes in macroeconomic fundamentals, such as real GDP 
growth and real exchange rate overvaluation. We investigate this issue in the context of our non-
linear model by estimating the impact of different values of the macroeconomic fundamentals on  
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the likelihood of currency crises probit framework against the background of very restrictive and 
very relaxed capital controls.   
We employ probability models (probit) to measure the impact of changing capital 
controls on the likelihood of currency and capital flow instability.  Our aim is to test how the 
likelihood of exchange rate crises are influenced over time and by our duration-adjusted measure 
of capital control intensity. We are especially interested in whether the duration-adjusted 
measure is better able to explain currency crises than standard de jure measures of capital control 
intensity. We also use the nonlinear nature of the probit specification to investigate how capital 
controls may have indirect effects on the vulnerability of countries to currency crises. In 
particular, we investigate how the presence or absence of capital controls change the sensitivity 
of currency crises to changes in real GDP growth and real exchange rate overvaluation.  
We find that countries with less restrictive capital controls and more liberalized regimes 
appear to be less prone to currency crises and this characteristic has become more pronounced in 
recent years (1995-2004).  Maintaining real GDP growth and limiting real overvaluation of the 
currency also help limit the likelihood of currency crises. In addition, we investigate an indirect 
channel that is largely ignored in the literature and find that the presence of capital controls 
greatly increases the sensitivity of currency crises to changes in real GDP growth and real 
exchange rate overvaluation. This heighted sensitivity makes countries with capital controls 
more vulnerable to macroeconomic volatility. 
Our sample period is limited by the availability of data on capital controls, which ends in 
2004, and excludes the recent 2007-08 global financial crisis that emanated from the United  
States. However, our results can help explain why the crisis had relatively limited effects on 
emerging markets during its initial phase from mid 2007 to mid 2008 (see Dooley and 
Hutchison, 2009). First, there was no rush to impose capital controls prior to or during this  
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period of financial turbulence and therefore no ―signaling‖ of weakness in fundamentals to 
international investors. Second, macroeconomic fundamentals in most developing countries were 
relatively strong going into the period of turbulence. Real GDP growth was robust and a degree 
of exchange rate flexibility, not seen prior to the 1997-98 Asia crisis, limited the degree of real 
exchange rate overvaluation. The buildup of international reserves by many emerging markets 
also limited their vulnerability to financial shocks from abroad. It was only after the failure of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008 that the crisis intensified dramatically, generating a 
―common‖ financial shock to all emerging markets, with capital flows shifting away from 
countries that were viewed as more vulnerable. This largely distinguishes this crisis—with a 
common shock emanating from advanced economies, especially the U.S.-- from previous 
episodes considered in our analysis that were mainly confined to emerging markets. 
Section 2 reviews the literature linking capital account restrictions and currency/capital 
flow stability. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and data. Section 4 presents the 
results from testing the effect of capital market restrictions, both over different sample periods 
and using our duration-adjusted measure of controls, on the likelihood of currency crises. This 
section also investigates how the presence or absence of capital account restrictions changes the 
interaction between other important determinants—real GDP growth and real exchange rate 
overvaluation—and the likelihood of financial crises. Section 5 concludes the study.  
 
2. Capital Controls, Sequence of Financial Liberalization, and Instability  
The idea of restricting capital mobility as a means of reducing macroeconomic instability 
has a long history. Indeed, stringent restrictions and limitations on capital flows were the norm 
during the Bretton Woods era, and over much of the immediate post-war period they were 
officially sanctioned by most governments in the large industrial countries and by the 
International Monetary Fund. With the turbulence in exchange markets following the  
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introduction of generalized floating, Tobin (1978) argued that a global tax on foreign exchange 
transactions would reduce destabilizing speculation in international financial markets. After the 
European currency crisis of 1992-93, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) proposed Tobin taxes to 
discourage short-term speculators from betting against major currencies. In the aftermath of the 
Asia currency crisis of 1997-98, Krugman (1998) proposed limiting capital flows for developing 
countries that were unsuitable for either currency unions or free floating exchange rate regimes. 
In a similar vein, Stiglitz (2000) and Eichengreen (1999) have argued that developing countries 
should manage and limit capital flows under certain market conditions.  
A large literature on the appropriate sequencing of financial liberalization also suggests 
that early lifting of controls on the capital account may destabilize the economy. McKinnon 
(1973, 1993), for example, maintains that decontrol of the capital account should come at the end 
of the reform sequence, following domestic financial liberalization, bank reform, and trade 
liberalization. In particular, McKinnon argues that a rapid inflow of (official or private) capital 
will cause real appreciation of the exchange rate, making it difficult for domestic tradeables 
producers ―to adjust to the removal of protection‖ (1993, p. 117). Thus, ―[a] big injection of 
capital at the time the liberalization occurs finances an unusual increase in imports while 
decreasing exports and throws out the wrong long-run price signals in private markets‖ (ibid., see 
also Edwards 1984, pp. 3–4).  
On the other hand, capital controls may also have a destabilizing effect. Restrictions on 
the international capital account may in fact lead to a net capital outflow and precipitate 
increased financial instability. Dooley and Isard (1980) point out that controls preventing 
investors from withdrawing capital from a country act like a form of investment irreversibility: 
by making it more difficult to get capital out in the future, controls may make investors less 
willing to invest in a country. Following this reasoning, Bartolini and Drazen (1997a, b) show  
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that imposing capital controls can send a signal of inconsistent and poorly designed future 
government policies. This channel of influence may be more evident during a period of relative 
stability in the world economy, such as that termed the ―Great Moderation‖ (of inflation), which 
prevailed during a substantial part of our sample period.   Against the backdrop of a generally 
stable world economy, the presence of capital controls may signal greater vulnerability to foreign 
speculative pressure. 
Capital controls may also be ineffective and distortionary. Edwards (1999), for example, 
argues that legal capital restrictions frequently prove ineffective, and are easily sidestepped by 
domestic and foreign residents and firms. He documents how capital controls may lead to 
economic distortions and government corruption that in turn contribute to economic instability.  
Several empirical papers have investigated the experiences with capital controls of 
selected developing countries. Edison and Reinhart (2001a) focus on the recent experiences of 
Malaysia and Thailand
2, while Edwards (1999) and Gregorio et al (2000) examine Chile. In 
general, these studies have found little effect of capital controls in averting currency crises, at 
least not without other supporting economic policies. Using various econometric tests and a 
detailed case study of Chilean controls imposed in the 1980s, for example, Edwards (1999) finds 
that ―…the relative absence of contagion effect on Chile [during the currency crises of the 
1990s] is due to its sturdy banking regulation and not to its capital controls policy‖ (p. 22). This 
finding is supported by Edwards’ (1989) analysis of the role of capital controls in thirty-nine 
devaluation episodes for twenty-four developing countries over the period 1961–82. He finds 
that countries typically intensified their control programs in the year before devaluation, and 
concludes that ―[a]t most one can argue that these heightened impediments to trade managed to 
slow down the unavoidable balance of payments crisis‖ (pp. 189–90).  
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Other studies provide a more mixed view of the effects of capital controls on the factors 
contributing to currency pressures in developing countries. On the one hand, Bartolini and 
Drazen (1997a), who survey a number of episodes of capital account liberalization, find that the 
easing of restrictions on capital outflows often represented early ingredients of a broad set of 
reforms (including the lifting of various elements of financial repression) and frequently led to 
large capital inflows. On the other hand, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), investigating the 
effects of restrictions on capital flows in a panel of industrial and developing economies, find 
that capital controls have a significant negative effect on foreign borrowing, interpreting their use 
as a means of enforcing financial repression of the economy. They also find that capital controls 
are associated with lower domestic interest rates, consistent with the view that they limit 
international arbitrage in asset markets.  
Glick and Hutchison (2005) systematically investigate the link between capital controls 
(or international payments restrictions generally) and currency stability for a broad sample of 
developing economies. They also investigate other empirical factors explaining both currency 
crises and capital account restrictions, and causal linkages between the two phenomena. Their 
results find a statistically significant positive link between capital controls (measured de jure 
dichotomously as to whether controls are in place or not in place). This result is robust to a 
variety of specifications and estimation methods that take into account simultaneity issues. Glick, 
Guo and Hutchison (2006) are concerned that earlier results may be biased by self-selection 
issues—countries facing exchange rate instability are more likely to impose capital controls, 
hence a positive link between the two phenomena. They introduce a propensity-score matching 
methods methodology to address the self-selection problem. This method allows a better 
measurement of the counterfactual (what would have occurred in the absence of capital controls) 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 Edison and Reinhart (2001b) also include Brazil and Spain in their analysis.  
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by which to estimate the impact of capital controls on exchange rate instability. Surprisingly, the 
earlier results hold up and support Bartolini and Drazen (1997a)—countries with capital controls 
are more likely to experience currency crises.  
Several recent studies have investigated the link between capital controls/financial market 
liberalization and capital flow contractions-reversals-sudden stops using multi-country panel data 
sets. Eichengreen et al. (2006) find a weak negative association between capital account 
liberalization and sudden stops but it is generally not statistically significant. Edwards (2005) 
also finds some evidence of a negative association between capital account liberalization and 
sudden stops.  Edwards (2007), on the other hand, finds evidence that capital controls lower the 
likelihood of capital flow contractions. He uses three alternative measures of capital controls and 
investigates both ―capital flow contractions‖ (small and medium-sized contractions in net capital 
inflows) and sudden stops (major reversals in net capital inflows).  More recently Binici et al. 
(2009) find that controls in emerging markets may significantly reduce equity capital inflows, 
but have limited effect on debt inflows or capital outflows.   
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Defining Currency Crises  
Our primary indicator of currency crises (xrp_nw) is constructed from ―large‖ changes in an 
index of currency pressure, defined as a weighted average of monthly real exchange rate  
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changes
3 and monthly (percent) reserve losses.
4 Following convention (e.g. Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999), the weights attached to the exchange rate and reserve components of the 
currency pressure index are inversely related to the variance of changes of each component over 
the sample for each country.
5 The exchange rate and reserve data are drawn from the 
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics CD-ROM (lines ae and 1l.d, 
respectively).  
Our measure presumes that any nominal currency changes associated with exchange rate 
pressure should affect the purchasing power of the domestic currency, i.e. result in a change in 
the real exchange rate (at least in the short run). This condition excludes some large 
depreciations that occur during high inflation episodes, but it avoids screening out sizable 
depreciation events in more moderate inflation periods for countries that have occasionally 
experienced periods of hyperinflation and extreme devaluation.
6 Large changes in exchange rate 
pressure are defined as changes in our pressure index that exceed the mean plus 2 times the 
                                                 
3 Real exchange rate changes are defined in terms of the trade-weighted sum of bilateral real exchange 
rates (constructed in terms of CPI indices, line 64 of the IFS) against the U.S. dollar, the German mark, 
and the Japanese yen, where the trade-weights are based on the average of bilateral trade with the 
United States, the European Union, and Japan in 1980 and 1990 (from the IMF’s Direction of Trade). 
Most panel studies of currency crises define the currency pressure measure in terms of the bilateral 
exchange rate against a single foreign country. For example, Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) 
and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) measure the real exchange rate for all of the developing countries in 
their sample against the U.S. dollar. In defining the effective rate in terms of the three major nations 
likely to be the main trading partners of most developing countries, our approach provides a broader 
measure than these other studies and is computationally easier to construct than a multilateral exchange 
rate measure defined in terms of all of a country’s trading partners. Possible alternatives, such as the 
effective exchange rate measures constructed by the IMF, OECD, and others, are not available for a 
broad sample of developing countries.  
4 Ideally, reserve changes should be scaled by the level of the monetary base or some other money 
aggregate, but such data is not generally available on a monthly basis for most countries. 
5 Our currency pressure measure of crises does not include episodes of defense involving sharp rises in 
interest rates. Data for market-determined interest rates are not available for much of the sample period 
in many of the developing countries in our dataset.   
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country-specific standard deviation, provided that it also exceeds 5 percent.
7 The first condition 
insures that any large (real) depreciation is counted as a currency crisis, while the second 
condition attempts to screen out changes that are insufficiently large in an economic sense 
relative to the country-specific monthly change of the exchange rate. Our sample of currency 
crisis episodes are listed in Appendix A.  
 
3.2 Measuring Restrictions on International Payments 
We utilize two measures of capital account restrictions in this study, both based on de 
jure (legal and administrative controls). Our first measure, kaclosed, is a transformation of the 
Chinn and Ito (2006 and updated) measure of capital account openness. Their measure is based 
on underlying data reported in the International Monetary Fund’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). They consider the binary indices in 
four categories: restrictions on capital account transactions, restrictions on current account 
transactions, requirement to surrender export proceeds and presence of multiple exchange rates. 
kaopen is the first principle component of these four binary indices (where each value is given a 
value of 0 if there are restrictions in place, and 1 otherwise; a value of 1 indicates no restrictions, 
i.e. an ―open‖ capital account). This measure attempts to measure intensity of controls insofar 
that intensity is correlated with other restrictions on foreign exchange transactions. Our kaclosed 
measure transforms the Chinn-Ito openness measure to a capital account closed intensity 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 This approach differs from that of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), for example, who deal with episodes 
of hyperinflation by separating the nominal exchange rate depreciation observations for each country 
according to whether or not inflation in the previous 6 months was greater than 150 percent, and they 
calculate for each sub-sample separate standard deviation and mean estimates with which to define 
exchange rate crisis episodes. 
7  Other studies defining the threshold of large changes in terms of country-specific moments include 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999); Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998); and Esquivel and Larrain 
(1998). Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) use a three standard deviation cut-off. While the choice of cut-
off point is somewhat arbitrary, Frankel and Rose (1996) suggest that the results are not very sensitive 
to the precise cut-off chosen in selecting crisis episodes.  
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measure, and rebases it to the [0, 100] scale where higher values indicate greater intensity of 
restrictions on capital account transactions.   
  Our duration-adjusted measure of capital controls (kaclosed_dur) assumes that 
administrative controls ―depreciate‖ at the rate: 1/exp(0.2 * duration), where duration is the 
number of periods since the last administrative or legal changes in capital controls. A number of 
depreciation rates were investigated and this rate of decay chosen since it implies a gradual 
decline in how the effectiveness of controls, with a half-life of about five years, and more intense 
circumvention of controls when they are most binding and more gradual deterioration in latter 
periods.   
 
3.3 Determinants of Currency Crises  
An important part of our work is to identify appropriate control variables in our 
multivariate probit models. We want to ensure that empirical links between external controls and 
currency crises are not spurious, attributable to variables omitted from the probit regressions. 
The theoretical and empirical literature has identified a vast array of variables potentially 
associated with currency crises (see, e.g. Frankel and Rose, 1996; Kaminsky et al, 1998; 
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Eichengreen et al., 2006; Edwards, 2007). The choice of 
explanatory variables in our benchmark model for the analysis was determined by the questions 
we posed earlier, the availability of data, and previous results found in the literature. We 
postulate a ―canonical‖ model of currency crises in order to form a basic starting point to 
investigate the effects of capital controls. The main source of the macro data is the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics (CD-ROM).  
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Our basic canonical model consists of four macroeconomic control variables that are 
lagged to limit simultaneity problems. These variables are domestic credit growth (line 32)
8, the 
current account to GDP ratio (line 78ald times xrrf divided by 99b) real GDP growth (line 99b.r 
or 99b.p), and real exchange rate overvaluation.
9 These variables were found by Glick and 
Hutchison (2006) to be significant and robust determinants in a model of currency crises.  
We expect rapid domestic credit growth to be relatively high prior to a currency crisis. A 
rise in credit growth may signal an expansionary central bank policy, future price increases, 
expansionary fiscal policy or an unsustainably overheated economy. A larger current account 
surplus-to-GDP ratio would be expected to lessen the likelihood of a currency crisis. We also 
expect relatively large exchange rate overvaluation and declining real output growth to be 
associated with increased likelihood of a currency crisis
10. Substantially overvalued exchange 
rates may lead to the expectation that a large adjustment may occur, and declining real GDP 
growth may signal worsening economic conditions and undermine investor confidence in home-
country investment opportunities.
11 
                                                 
8 As in Glick and Hutchison (2006), we also used the log ratio of broad money to foreign reserves (lines 
34 plus 35 divided by 1ld times ae). However, in no instance was this variable statistically significant 
and was therefore omitted from the regressions.  
9 Following Kaminsky et al (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), among others, we construct the 
degree of real exchange rate overvaluation from deviations from a fitted trend in the real trade-weighted 
exchange rate index, where the exchange rate index we fit is the annual average of the monthly series 
used in constructing the exchange rate component of our currency pressure index (see footnote 5). As 
reported in Section 5.1, we also consider other measures of overvaluation as a robustness check.  
10 The assumption is that contemporaneous output fluctuations influence the likelihood of currency crises 
with no reverse causality, i.e. we assume that it takes some time for a currency crisis to influence 
output. Moreover, we do not measure any longer-term effects on growth that may be associated with 
the systematic imposition of capital controls as in China presently or South Korea in the 1970s-1980s. 
11 Ostry et. al. (2010) report evidence that some countries with larger stocks of debt liabilities or financial 
foreign direct investment experienced worse growth slowdowns during the global financial crisis of 
2007-08. However, we do not explicitly include balance sheet exposure in our analysis due to data 
limitations, particularly in terms of currency denomination, for a substantial number of countries in our 
sample. It is possible that capital controls, to the extent they are effective, could reduce balance sheet 
exposure, e.g. the exposure to currency mismatches, and thereby reduce the likelihood of a currency 
crisis (or reduce the output cost of a currency crisis). If this were the case, however, one would expect  
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3.4 Data Sample and Measurement Concerns 
Our data sample is determined by the theoretical determinants of currency market and 
capital flow volatility and by the availability of data. We do not confine our analysis to countries 
experiencing currency crises. That is, we include developing and emerging market countries that 
both did and did not experience a severe currency crisis/speculative attack during the 1975–06 
sample period. Using such a broad control group allows us to make inferences about the 
conditions and characteristics distinguishing countries encountering financial disruptions and 
others managing to avoid them.  
We have a sample of 69 developing and emerging-market countries.
12 We use annual 
crisis observations in our analysis. While we employ monthly data for our (real) exchange rate 
pressure index to identify currency crises and date each by the year in which it occurs, using 
annual data enables inclusion of a relatively large number of countries. 
For each country-year in our sample, we construct binary measures of currency crises, as 
defined above (1 = crisis, 0 = no crisis). A currency crisis (xrp_nw) is deemed to have occurred 
for a given year if the change in currency pressure for any month of that year satisfies our criteria 
(i.e. two standard deviations above the mean as well as greater than five percent in magnitude)
13. 
                                                                                                                                                             
that the presence of capital controls would capture this transmission mechanism and reduce the 
likelihood of a currency crisis.  
12 Our developing country sample excludes major oil-exporting countries. 
13 In robustness tests, we also consider a indicator that only measures the onset of a crisis (xrp_on) and a 
measure with windows (xrp_w). The measure with windows reduces the chances of capturing the 
continuation of the same currency crisis episode. In particular, after identifying each ―large‖ monthly 
change in currency pressure, we treat any large changes in the following 24-month window as a part of 
the same currency episode and skip the years of that change before continuing the identification of new 
crises. The results were very similar to our baseline case using xrp_nw and are omitted for brevity.   
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4. Estimation Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics on Currency Crises and Capital Controls 
Table 1 shows the occurrence of currency crises and capital controls over 1975–2006, 
and by 5-year intervals (except for the last two years of the sample). The table reports the 
unconditional frequency of currency crises and presence of capital controls (number of ―crisis‖ 
or ―controls in place‖ observations, divided by the total number of observations).  
The 69 developing countries in our dataset experienced 308 currency crises over 1975–
2006, implying a frequency of 15.8 percent of the available country-year observations. Crises 
were least frequent during the early (1975–79 period: around 12 percent average frequency) and 
latter years (2000-2006: around 10.0 percent average frequency), and most frequent during the 
1985–89 period (22.6 percent frequency). Currency crises around the world are not uncommon 
events, and there is no evidence of a trend increase in the frequency of currency crises over 
time.
15 
Table 1 also reports the intensity of restrictions on capital flows during the period. 
―Capital controls‖ ranges from 0 (no controls) to 100 (complete controls). ―Capital controls—
duration measure‖ also ranges from 0 to 100. The table reports average values for the entire 
sample and 5-year sub-periods. The average intensity of capital controls over the 1975-2004 
period was about 68 and 44, respectively, for capital controls and capital controls-duration. The 
                                                 
14 We are limited to 1975-2004 in our probit regressions, however, because the capital control index stops 
in 2004.  
15 Currency crises were most frequent in Africa (16.2 percent frequency), and least frequent in Asia (9.6 
percent). Despite recent high profile currency crises in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Korea, the 
developing economies in Asia have been less frequently affected by currency instability.  
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intensity of capital controls was in the 71-78 range during the 1975-94 period, and fell sharply 
after the mid-1970s (in the 53-59 range) reflecting a major push towards international financial 
liberalization and decontrol of international transactions. The capital control-duration measure 
indicates that capital controls were gradually eroding through most of the sample. 
 
4.2 Probit estimation results 
Our use of probit models allows us to focus on the contribution of payment restrictions to 
currency crises while controlling for other macroeconomic factors that vary across time and 
country. We estimate the probability of currency crises using a multivariate probit model for our 
data set of developing countries over 1975–2006. We observe that either a country at a particular 
time (observation t) is experiencing a currency crisis (i.e. the binary dependent variable, say yt, 
takes on a value of unity), or it is not (yt = 0). The probability that a crisis will occur, Pr(yt = 1), is 
hypothesized to be a function of a vector of characteristics associated with observation t, xt , and 
the parameter vector ß. The likelihood function of the probit model is constructed across the n 
observations (the number of countries times the number of observations for each country) and 
the log of the function  
n
t t t t t x F y x F y L
1
' ' )) ( 1 ln( ) 1 ( ) ( ln ln  
is then maximized with respect to the unknown parameters using non-linear maximum 
likelihood. The function F(.) is the standardized normal distribution. All equations are estimated 
with random effects.  
In each table we report the effect of a one-unit change in each regressor on the probability 
of a crisis (expressed in percentage points so that .01=1%), evaluated at the mean of the data. We 
include the associated z-statistics in parentheses; these test the null of no effect. Note that the 
sample size of the probit analysis varies depending on the set of variables considered.   
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We also report various diagnostic measures. For dependent binary variables, it is natural 
to ask what fraction of the observations are ―correctly called,‖ where, for example, a crisis 
episode is correctly called when the estimated probability of crisis is above a given cut-off level 
and a crisis in fact occurs. The chosen cut-off point should reasonably differ depending on the 
unconditional probability of the event and problem at hand
16. For our ―goodness-of-fit‖ statistics 
we consider two different probability cut-offs: 10 percent and 25 percent. These cut-offs bracket 
the unconditional frequency of currency crises.  
 
4.3 Has Worldwide Financial Globalization Eroded the Effectiveness of Capital Controls?   
The question of whether the rise in international financial market integration has eroded 
the effectiveness of domestic restrictions in reducing the likelihood of currency crises is 
addressed in Tables 2. We consider three samples—the full sample (1975-2004), the early period 
(1975-1994) and the recent period (1995-2004). We are looking for patterns across time in the 
effectiveness of capital controls and other factors that may influence the vulnerability of 
countries to currency instability. Our expectation is that capital controls, to the extent that they 
were ever effective, are likely to have been less effective in recent years.  
The dependent variable denotes whether a currency crisis (Table 2) has occurred for a 
given observation
17. The focus explanatory variable for our purposes is the extent of capital 
account restrictiveness—kaclosed. The control independent variables are: credit growth (lagged), 
current account/GDP ratio (lagged), real overvaluation (lagged) and real GDP growth (lagged). 
Probit models with random effects are estimated.  A positive coefficient value of kaclosed 
indicates that higher restrictiveness of capital controls are associated with increasing likelihood 
                                                 
16 See Greene (2000) for a broader discussion.   
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of currency crises. Higher credit growth and larger real overvaluation is expected to increase the 
likelihood of a currency crisis. A larger current account ratio and higher GDP growth is expected 
to lower the likelihood of a currency crisis.  
Table 2 presents the estimates for currency crises, together with summary and goodness-
of-fit statistics. There are 1495 observations for the full 1975-2004 sample period. (The number 
of observations is limited by having observations on each independent variable for a given 
country at a given point in time). About 81 (44) percent of the observations are predicted 
accurately, judging by the 25% (10%) cutoff value. Capital controls are highly statistically 
significant in all three samples, but with a sign suggesting more restrictive controls are 
associated with a higher probability of a currency crisis. The point estimates (reporting the 
marginal effects calculated at the mean for all of the independent variables) indicate that controls 
did not provide insulation against currency crises in either the early or the recent period, and that 
the point estimate on controls has climbed from 0.12 to 0.15. . This indicates that capital controls 
appear to be especially problematic in recent years-- in the era of financial globalization, 
imposing controls may signal currency weakness that in turn generates loss of confidence, capital 
outflows and precipitate currency crisis. In particular, a ten point rise in the restrictiveness of 
controls increases the probability of a currency crisis by 1.5 percent.  Stated another way, our 
results suggest that if a country were to move from complete restrictiveness (kaclosed = 100) to 
complete openness (kaclosed = 0), it would reduce the likelihood of a currency crisis by 15 
percent.  
This is an empirical result consistent with Glick and Hutchison (2005) and Glick, Guo 
and Hutchison (2006), and consistent with the signaling theory of the perverse effects of capital 
                                                                                                                                                             
17 This dependent variable measure does not impose windows. We also estimated equations with windows 
imposed (two years before and after a currency crisis were deleted from the data set) and for the onset 
of a currency crisis only (i.e. only the first year of a crisis).   
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controls put forward by Bartolini and Drazen (1997a,b). It is noteworthy that Glick, Guo and 
Hutchison (2006) find that this result is not due to ―self-selection‖, i.e. countries with weak 
economic conditions simultaneously impose controls and experience currency instability. (They 
use a propensity-score matching methodology to control for selection bias and still find a 
statistically significant positive correlation between controls and probability of a crisis).  
The control variables in the three regressions all have the expected signs, but only real 
overvaluation and real GDP growth are statistically significant. The regressions indicate that the 
likelihood of a currency crisis is more sensitive to real overvaluation (larger real overvaluation 
increases the probability of a crisis) and real GDP growth (a higher growth rate lowers the 
probability of a crisis) during the recent period compared to earlier years when financial 
globalization was less pervasive.   
We looked further into the evolution of capital control effectiveness by considering six 
five-year sub-samples, starting with 1975-79 and ending with 2000-04. The objective is to 
identify more precisely where major shifts may have occurred in the factors contributing to 
currency crises. The point estimates for the explanatory variables are less statistically significant 
in the sub-samples, reflecting fewer observations and less power in estimation, and offer no new 
insights beyond those reported in Table 2. We omit these results for brevity but they are 
available from the authors upon request.   
 
4.4 The Erosion of Capital Controls 
Table 3 reports the estimation results from using our kaclosed_dur measure of capital 
controls for currency crises.  As discussed above, this variable ―depreciates‖ the de jure measure 
of capital controls and is intended to capture the erosion of administrative measures limiting 
capital flows as agents find ways to circumvent controls and as controls also spur the 
development of new financial instruments that facilitate moving capital in and out of countries.  
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This duration measure of controls is country-specific, and declines over time at a (constant) rate 
proportional to the level of initial capital controls.     
The results with kaclosed_dur are qualitatively similar to those reported earlier using 
kaclosed but are even larger in magnitude: more restrictive controls are associated with a higher 
likelihood of currency crisis. The coefficients estimates for the three samples are statistically 
significant, and the point estimate almost doubles from the early to the recent sample (0.09 to 
0.17).  This again suggests that imposing capital controls in our present environment of 
―financial globalization‖ may be more problematic—signaling weakness and inducing capital 
flight and currency crises—than in the earlier period.  
The coefficient estimates for the control variables in the regressions reported in Table 3 
are almost identical to those reported in Table 2 (with kaclosed). Avoiding real exchange rate 
overvaluation and maintaining strong real GDP growth are critical factors in lowering the 
likelihood of a currency crisis, and this result is stronger in recent years of financial globalization 
than in the earlier sample period.  
The links between capital account restrictiveness and the probability of a currency crisis 
is explored further in Figure 1. It shows the nonlinear relationship between the degree of capital 
account restrictiveness and the probability of a crisis, holding constant all other explanatory 
variables at their mean values. The Figure is based on the estimates from the more recent sample 
period (1995-2004). The probability of a currency crisis ranges from 5 percent when the capital 
account is fully open to 25 percent when the capital account is completely closed.   
 
4.5 The Linkages between Capital Controls and the Effects of Real GDP Growth and Real 
Overvaluation 
Figures 2 and 3 consider in more detail how different levels of capital controls change the 
way real GDP and real overvaluation impact the likelihood of currency crises. This is what we  
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term the ―indirect‖ effect of capital controls on the likelihood of a currency crisis. In particular, 
Figure 2 plots the likelihood of currency crises for different rates of real GDP growth, given 
completely open and completely closed capital accounts. Similarly, Figure 3 plots the likelihood 
of currency crises for different levels of real exchange rate overvaluation, given completely open 
and completely closed capital accounts.   
Lower real GDP growth increases the likelihood of both currency crises, a non-linear 
relationship that is increasingly high the lower is output growth. The effects of capital controls 
on this relationship differ markedly between currency crises. In particular, in Figure 2 there is a 
substantial difference in the effects of real GDP growth on currency crises depending on whether 
capital controls are highly restrictive (upper dashed curve) or largely absent (lower solid curve). 
This difference is negligible at high rates of GDP growth but grows substantially when output 
falls. In the absence of capital controls, a fall in GDP of 5 percent is associated with about a 15 
percent likelihood of currency crisis (with other explanatory variables at their mean values). This 
probability rises to over 40 percent when capital controls are in place. In development 
economies, a fall in output of this order of magnitude is not unusual and with capital controls in 
place puts the economy at risk for a currency crisis..   
Figure 3 undertakes a similar analysis for real exchange rate overvaluations. The upper 
dashed curve (lower solid curve) of Figure 3 shows the likelihood of currency crises to different 
levels of real overvaluation given that the capital account is completely closed (completely 
open). As overvaluation increases, the likelihood of a currency crisis increases markedly when 
the capital account is closed, e.g. the likelihood of a currency crisis is about 10 percent with 
―undervaluation‖ of 50 percent and rises to a likelihood of 40 percent with a 50 percent 
overvaluation. By contrast, when the capital account is open, real overvaluation has a much 
smaller effect on the likelihood of a crisis and the likelihood is less sensitive to change in real  
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overvaluation, i.e. the likelihood ranges from 0 to 10 percent.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
We investigate the effectiveness of capital controls in insulating economies from 
currency crises, focusing in particular on (1) direct and indirect (working through other 
fundamental determinants) effects and (2) how these relationships may have changed over time 
in response to global financial changes and the development of domestic and off-shore financial 
markets.  
Our results suggest that the presence or absence of capital controls appear to have quite 
different effects on currency crises. Both standard and duration-adjusted measures of capital 
control intensity (allowing controls to ―depreciate‖ over time) suggest that capital controls have 
not effectively insulated economies from currency crises at any time during our sample period. 
The duration-adjusted measure, however, is a more accurate predictor of the likelihood of a 
currency crisis. Countries with less restrictive capital controls and more liberalized regimes 
appear to be less prone to currency crises; this characteristic has become more pronounced in the 
latter years of sample period (1995-2004) when the ―Great Moderation‖ (of inflation) across 
much of the world reduced economic volatility and likely made countries that imposed capital 
controls—thereby signaling underlying problems-- more vulnerable to speculative pressures.  
In all cases that we investigate, maintaining real GDP growth and preventing real 
overvaluation of the currency appear to be critical factors preventing currency crises. Moreover, 
the presence of capital controls greatly increases the sensitivity of currency crises to changes in 
real GDP growth and real exchange rate overvaluation. In this way, capital controls appear to 
indirectly make the economy much more vulnerable to macroeconomic fluctuations. By contrast, 
the presence of capital controls does not have much effect on the sensitivity of currency crises to 
changes in real GDP growth and real exchange rate overvaluation.    
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Our results may help to understand why most emerging markets fared relatively well 
during the recent global financial crisis that emanated from the United States. First, there was no 
rush to impose capital controls prior to or during this period of financial turbulence. This meant 
that no obvious signals of weakness were evident that might have spawned speculative pressures. 
Second, the apparent decoupling of many emerging markets, particularly in Asia,  from 
developments in the U.S. and other industrial countries may be attributable to their relatively 
strong output growth and greater exchange rate flexibility that prevented sustained overvaluation  
in currency values prior to the crisis. This degree of exchange rate flexibility, for example, was 
not evident prior the 1997-98 Asian crisis. The buildup of international reserves by many 
emerging markets also limited their vulnerability to the financial shock. It was only after the 
failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 that the crisis intensified dramatically, generating 
a ―common‖ financial shock to all emerging markets, with capital flows shifting away from 
countries that were viewed as more vulnerable. This largely distinguishes this crisis—with a 
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Currency crisesa  15.76  12.17  16.90  22.59  18.58  17.52  10.74  5.56 
(Number of crises)  (308)  (32)  (48)  (68)  (60)  (58)  (35)  (7) 
Capital controlsb1  67.96  71.17  75.77  77.89  71.63  59.41  53.05  (N.A.) 
Capital controlsb2  43.7  48.28  46.17  44.74  41.51  46.52  35.77  (N.A.) 
a  Number of crises divided by total country-years with available data. Number of crises in parentheses.  
Currency crisis measure is “xrp_nw” 




Table 2: Determinants of Currency Crises 
Explanatory Variable  1975-2004  1975-1994  1995-2004 
       
Capital acct. controls (t)   0.14587  0.11665  0.14815 
(ka_closed)  (3.936)***  (2.040)**  (3.015)*** 
Credit growth (t-1)   0.01076  0.01451  0.00589 
  (0.416)  (0.466)  (0.113) 
Current account/GDP (t-1)  -0.12531  -0.0693  -0.25967 
  (0.850)  (0.358)  (1.189) 
Real overvaluation (t-1)   0.13194  0.14454  0.15333 
  (3.448)***  (3.063)***  (2.102)*** 
Real GDP growth (t-1)   -1.02153  -0.88291  -1.16942 
  (5.509)***  (3.558)***  (4.289)*** 
Summary Statistics 
No. of Crises  235  152  83 
No. of Observations  1495  918  577 
Log likelihood  -598.837  -387.711  -210.016 
Goodness-of-fit (25% cutoff) a 
% of obs. correctly called  81  80  85 
% of crises correctly called  25  22  29 
% of non-crises correctly called  91  91  95 
Goodness-of-fit (10% cutoff) a 
% of obs. correctly called  44  37  57 
% of crises correctly called  84  89  77 
% of non-crises correctly called  36  27  54 
 
Note:  The table reports the coefficients in the Random Effects Probit Regressions with associated z-statistic (for 
hypothesis of no effect) in parentheses below. Results significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Constant included, but not reported. 
   Coefficient reported are the marginal effects evaluated at the mean of independent variables. 
  Coefficients are multiplied by 100 giving marginal effects in terms of %. 
 
a  Goodness-of-fit statistics defined respectively as (A + D) / (A + B + C + D), A / (A + C), and D / (B + D), 
where A(C) denote number of crises with predictions of crises above (below) probability cutoff and B (D) 






Table 3: Determinants of Currency Crises: Duration-Adjusted Capital Controls 
Explanatory Variable  1975-2004  1975-1994  1995-2004 
       
Capital acct. controls_ duration (t)   0.13706  0.09236  0.16974 
(ka_closed_dur)  (3.862)***  (1.883)*  (3.238)*** 
Credit growth (t-1)   0.01552  0.01288  0.01116 
  (0.602)  (0.411)  (0.210) 
Current account/GDP (t-1)   -0.14017  -0.09034  -0.20548 
  (0.959)  (0.470)  (0.939) 
Real overvaluation (t-1)   0.14262  0.15207  0.14852 
  (3.677)***  (3.197)***  (2.048)** 
Real GDP growth (t-1)   -1.01074  -0.87866  -1.14344 
  (5.429)***  (3.528)***  (4.188)*** 
Summary Statistics 
No. of Crises  235  152  83 
No. of Observations  1495  918  577 
Log likelihood  -599.625  -388.149  -209.211 
Goodness-of-fit (25% cutoff) a 
% of obs. correctly called  81  80  86 
% of crises correctly called  23  24  29 
% of non-crises correctly called  92  91  96 
Goodness-of-fit (10% cutoff) a 
% of obs. correctly called  44  37  59 
% of crises correctly called  86  89  72 
% of non-crises correctly called  36  26  57 
 
Note:  The table reports the coefficients in the Random Effects Probit Regressions with associated z-statistic (for 
hypothesis of no effect) in parentheses below. Results significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Constant included, but not reported.  
  Coefficient reported are the marginal effects evaluated at the mean of independent variables. 
  Coefficients are multiplied by 100 giving marginal effects in terms of %. 
 
a  Goodness-of-fit statistics defined respectively as (A + D) / (A + B + C + D), A / (A + C), and D / (B + D), 
where A(C) denote number of crises with predictions of crises above (below) probability cutoff and B (D) 



































Figure 2.  Probability of  Currency Crisis given Real GDP Growth 
  For Fully Open (=0) and Closed (=100) Capital Account 
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Figure 3. Probability of Currency Crisis given Real Overvaluations 
  For Fully Open (=0) and Closed (=100) Capital Account 
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Appendix A.  Currency Crisis Episodes 
Country  Currency Crisis Episodes 
Argentina  1975-1976, 1982-1983, 1989-1991 
Bangladesh  1975- 1976 
Belize   
Bolivia  1981- 1985, 1988-1991 
Botswana  1982, 1985-1986, 1996, 1998, 2001-2002, 2005- 2006 
Brazil  1982-1983, 1987, 1990, 1998-2000, 2002 
Burundi  1976, 1983,1986, 1988-1989, 1991, 1997-2003 
Cameroon  1982, 1984, 1994 
Chile  1985 
China, P.R.: Hong Kong   
Colombia  1985, 1997-1999, 2002, 2006 
Costa Rica  1981 
Cyprus   
Dominican Republic  1985, 1987, 1990, 2004 
Ecuador  1982, 1985, 1988 
Egypt  1979, 1989-1991, 2003 
El Salvador  1986, 1990 
Equatorial Guinea   
Ethiopia  1992 
Fiji  1986-1987, 1998 
Ghana  1978, 1986-1987, 1990, 2000 
Grenada   
Guatemala  1986, 1989-1990 
Guinea-Bissau   1991, 1995-1996, 2003 
Guyana  1987, 1989-1991, 1999 
Haiti  1991, 1993-1994, 2000, 2002 
Honduras  1990 
Hungary  1989, 1995, 2003, 2006 
India  1975, 1978, 1983, 1986, 1991, 1993, 1995 
Indonesia  1978, 1983, 1986, 1997-1998 
Jamaica  1978, 1983-1984, 1990-1992 
Jordan  1983, 1987-1989, 1992, 2002 
Kenya  1975, 1981-1982, 1985, 1993-1995, 1997, 2003 
Korea  1980, 1997-1998  
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Lao People’s D. R.  1995, 1997-1999 
Madagascar  1984, 1986-1987, 1991, 1994, 1996, 2004 
Malawi  1985-1987, 1992, 1994, 1998 
Malaysia  1986, 1997-1998 
Mali  1993 
Malta  1992, 1997 
Mauritius  1979, 1981, 1998 
Mexico  1976, 1982, 1985, 1994-1995 
Morocco  1983-1985, 1990, 2001 
Mozambique   1993, 1995 
Myanmar  1975- 1977 
Nepal  1975, 1978, 1981-1982, 1984-1986, 1991, 1993, 1995 
Nicaragua  1979-1980, 1993, 1995 
Nigeria  1986, 1992-1993, 1999 
Pakistan  1999-2000 
Panama   
Paraguay  1984- 1986, 1988-1989, 1992, 1999, 2002 
Peru  1976-1977, 1979, 1981, 1987-1988  
Philippines  1983-1984, 1986, 1997, 2000 
Romania  1990-1992, 1997, 1999 
Sierra Leone  1988- 1990, 1997-1999 
Singapore  1975, 1998 
South Africa  1975, 1984-1986, 1996, 1998, 2001-2003, 2006 
Sri Lanka  1975, 1977, 1998 
Swaziland  1975, 1979, 1982, 1985-1986, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2006 
Syrian Arab Republic  1977, 1982, 1988 
Thailand  1997-1999 
Trinidad & Tobago  1985, 1988, 1993 
Tunisia  1993 
Turkey  1978-1980, 1994, 2001, 2006 
Uganda  1981, 1987-1989 
Uruguay  1982-1984, 2002 
Venezuela  1982, 1984, 1986, 1989-1990, 1994-1996, 2002-2003 
Zambia  1985-1987, 1993-1994 
Zimbabwe  1982, 1991, 1993-1994, 1997-1998, 2000 
 